Reasoning With Uncertain Knowledge by Craddock, A. Julian & Browse, Roger A.
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Reasoning with Uncertain Knowledge 
A. Julian Craddock & Roger A. Browse 
Department of Computing and Information Science 
Department of Psychology 
Queen's University at Kingston 
Ontario, Canada 
Heuristics derived from human experimentation are integrated with a knowledge network to pro­
duce a model for reasoning with uncertain information. The believability of knowledge is deter­
mined by collecting reasons for believing and not believing it. These reasons, or endorsements, are 
subsequently ordered by their belief, the reliability of their belief, and their importance relative to 
one another. 
INTRODUCTION: The development of mechanisms for the representation of knowledge has always 
been a central concern of artificial intelligence. The fundamental criteria for representational schemes 
have been adapted from criteria mathematics has set up for logical formalisms: (1) that a translation 
into the representation from natural language statements must be possible, and (2) that deduction and 
inference of a sort that yields results similar to human conclusions must be possible over the repre­
sentation. These criteria are not well met by knowledge representation schemes which are based on 
traditional mathematical logic. In particular human expression is characterized by the use of measures 
of uncertainty, and human reasoning often appears to not follow the dictates of logic and probability 
(Lindley, 1971). 
There are several solutions for the problems of uncertain information. The first is what Cohen (1983) 
called· the "engineering solution". This solution is used by many models in artificial intelligence 
(McDermott and Doyle 1980; McDermott 1980; McCarthy 1979; Reiter 1980). The solution does not 
deal with uncertainty as a useful source of information and constraints; instead it reduces the problem 
domain in such a manner as to eliminate uncertainty. Unfortunately eliminating uncertainty results in 
a reformulated problem that is, at the best, only vaguely related to the original. The second solution is 
to make quantitative assumptions about uncertainty using probabilities and possibilities (Zadeh 1983, 
1984; Lee 1969; Edwards 1982; Shortcliffe 1975). The quantitative assumptions often prove to be overly 
restrictive and lacking in expressive power. The third solution is to use a utility based solution 
(Nosteller and Nogee 1951; Schoemaker 1980). This solution makes the unpleasant assumption that 
we can determine subjective utilities for events and manipulate these utilities in a formal manner. Also, 
there are no clear indications that humans attempt to maximize their expected utilities while reasoning. 
A more promising approach to the role of uncertainty in human reasoning is presented by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1982a b). Their model indicates that humans employ a set of basic heuristics which aid 
in making decisions in conditions of uncertainty. These heuristics enable humans to constrain problem 
domains such that the uncertainty becomes manageable but still useful. Once these heuristics are re­
cognized as a part of human reasoning it no longer appears illogical in the sense of being erratic. but 
rather more pragmatic and difficult to specify in terms of the logical inference mechanisms of tradi­
tional logic. Humans simplify decision making situations and use mental shortcuts to reach solutions 
which are satisfactory within constraints, but not necessarily optimal with respect to formal mathe­
matical theory. Kahneman and Tversky (ibid) provide numerous examples in which subjects reach 
decisions which run counter to those reached by mathematical theories. 
The research reported in this paper pursues the problem of developing representational and inference 
mechanisms for talking about human reasoning under conditions of uncertainty. The direction we have 
taken is based on the belief that methods which model the way people think under uncertainty may be 
used in the construction of flexible and more understandable computational reasoning svstems. The 
model developed here involves collecting reasons for believing or disbelieving propositions as Cohen 
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(1983) does in his model of endorsement, and then qualifying these reasons by a measure of belief. In 
addition the belief measures can have varying degrees of certainty. The belief and certainty values can 
be used: (1) to determine how supportive a body of evidence for a particular hypothesis is and (2) to 
represent evidential relationships such as conflicts between decisions (Craddock 1986). 
2. BELIEF AND CERTAINTY: We shall now proceed with defining a network containing propositions 
with beliefs and certainties, interconnected by arcs. First, let P be a set of cognitive units 
p = {nl ... n,.}. Each of these cognitive units may represent a proposition such as I LIKE MATH or rela­
tionships among objects such as one might employ in descriptions of visual scenes. Each n; has asso­
ciated with it a belief strength b;, which is a measure of the extent to which the cognitive unit is 
believable. The believability of n; is a measure of the completeness of the supporting evidence for flj, 
not a measure of its incidence of occurrence or its possibility of occurrence. As -1 � b; � 1, we may 
view the cognitive units as statements in a fuzzy propositional logic in which a belief of -1 indicates n; 
is false and a belief of +1 indicates n; is true. 
In addition, each n; has associated with it a certainty, c, of the assignment of the value b, where 
0 � c; � 1. The certainty of a belief value is defined as a measure of the reliability of the evidence which 
was used to calculate a particular belief (Hamburger, 1985). Thus each cognitive unit represents two 
distinct aspects of the Rational R; = (b;, c;) of n;. To illustrate the distinction between the components, 
consider I LIKE MATH. This may have, for example b; = 0.4 indicating moderately strong liking for 
mathematics 1. On the other hand, the certainty c, of this value might be high or low, depending on the 
person's exposure to mathematics. Thus, it is important to note that the measure of a statement's cer­
tainty is not closely related to its belief. A statement can be highly believable but still be very uncertain. 
In a like fashion, a statement can be unbelievable but its incredibility may be very certain. 
Any cognitive unit may endorse another. Each endorsement has associated with it a numeric value 
corresponding to the extent of the support between the units. If n; endorses ni then the support node 
s;i is the support for the endorsement where -1 � S;i � 1. If -1 � s;i < 0 then the endorsement n; for ni 
is said to be inhibitory and if 0 � s;i � 1 then it is said to be excitatory. The support nodes for the 
endorsement, s;i may be endorsed by other cognitive units. For example: I LIKE PSYCHOLOGY may endorse 
I LIKE COMPUTING but the support for the endorsement may be contingent on COMPUTATION MAY MODEL 
COGNmON(see figure 1). If COMPUTATION MAY MODEL COGNITION is false then the support for the endorse­
ment will decrease (Craddock 1986). 
Before going on to consider the mechanisms which permit dynamic evaluations and maintenance of 
belief based on these assigned values, it is useful to develop a network representation for the belief 
system. If we consider P = { n1 ... n'"} as the set of propositional nodes of the network, then we can 
define S' = {sij I n;, ni E P, S;{ ,.,= 0} as a subset of support nodes such that n; endorses nj with support sij• and T = {ts;·l s;i E S', n1c E P)' as the other subset of support nodes such that n1c endorses s;i with support 
fs; • We cari then define the network N = <P, S> where S = S' U T is a finit set of support nodes re­
pfesenting the arcs and Pis a finit set of propositions._ 
3. COMPUTING BELIEF AND CERTAINTY VALUES: We wish to develop ways of computing the 
values of Rationale R; for a proposition n; on the basis of the endorsements available for that node. 
The strength of an endorsement between two nodes must be computed with consideration of b,. For 
example, given the structure as shown in figure 2, if a person likes essays, ie. b; = .8, then a net negative 
endorsement results for the node representing LIKING COMPUTING sciENCE, but if the value of b, is low, a 
net positive endorsement would result. We can compute this endorsement strength as e,1 = b;s,i. 
In this system, the belief strength· of a node may be computed from the beliefs and certainties of its 
endorsements. We note, however, that it is not possible to compute this for all nodes in the network 
because to do so would require every node to have endorsements. Any node in the system, can be 
provided with an Intuition represented as I,= (b',c',). This structure appears much the same as the 
This system does not distinguish between liking most mathematics, or liking all mathematics to some extent. 
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sij 
I LIKE PSYCHOLOGY 1----------1•�1 1 LIKE COMPUTING �-------------------� 
R; = (b;. C;) Ri = (bi, C) 
COMPUTATION MAY MODEL COGNITION 
Rk =-(bk, ck) 
Figure 1. An example of an endorsement which influences the strength of endorsement be-
tween two other nodes. 
Rationale structure except that its values are never computed, but they remain available to take part in 
the computation of other beliefs. As we shall see later on, if a node has both a Rationale, and an In­
tuition, the system will check to verify that the values do not become inconsistent. 
The computation of a belief value for a node is a function of the summary of the evidence and argu­
ments. In such instances belief depends on: (1) measuring the varying contributions of the individual 
endorsements and (2) measuring the effects of interaction among the different endorsements. This 
interaction among a set of endorsements {n1 ... n,.} for n1 depends on the relative importance of each 
endorsement defined as 
and the relative certainty defined as 
sii 
rij=-m---
r; lskj I 
k-1 
[1] 
ci rei=-. [2] 
·C 
where c· is max {ci ... c,.}. In this manner we can define a measure of belief using a formula such as 
m 
bi = I:rck X 'ki X bk 
k-1 
(3] 
Allowing the support of an endorsement to be endorsed enables us to deal with situations in which the 
endorsements {!11 .. . nm} for n1 are mutually exclusive. n1 will be given an endorsement of b·ski where b' =max {b1 ... bm}· The node nk will inhibit all the other endorsements by giving an inhibitory 
endorsement to their respective supports for the endorsement. This mutual exclusivity is somewhat 
similar to Rumelhart and Zipser's (1985) "Inhibitory Clusters" where nodes were arranged in groups in 
which the node with the highest activation inhibits the activations of all the other nodes. 
�.....-1 _LI_K_E_E_S_S_A_Y_s __ ----ll-- -s-ij----1·�1 I LIKE COMPUTER SCIENCE 
R; = (0.8, C;) 
Figure 2. : An example of an endorsement which may have net positive or net negative sup­
port. 
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The certainty of a belief is calculated as a function of the agreement of the individual endorsement 
strengths with the final belief value calculated from them. Thus, belief must be calculated before cer­
tainty. The importance of the agreement is once again measured as a function of the relative support 
of the individual endorsements and their relative certainties. As these values increase so does the un­
certainty associated with disagreement. Where {n1 ... n,.} are the endorsing nodes for n1, this effect can 
be modelled in formulas such as: 
ci = 1-
[ i: I (bk- bi) I X rki X rck] [4] 
k,oj, k=O 
4. A NETWORK OF BELIEF STRUCTURES The model described so far is similar to many existing 
connectionist models, particularly the spreading activation models of Anderson {1982), Rumelhart and 
McClelland {1982), and McClelland and Rumelhart (1983). However, because the model is intended 
to represent belief maintenance with uncertainty it differs in several important respects. First, the un­
certainty of a proposition is represented numerically, as the values of R;, and non-numerically, as the 
structure of endorsements. Second, once the endorsements have been collected they are subject to 
reasoning and natural heuristics to compute numeric values as depicted in formulae [1] to [4]. In con­
trast, most connectionist models ignore, or do not explicitly deal with the non-numeric representation 
of uncertainty, depending on numeric values alone which provide no evidence as to how they were 
calculated, what they actually represent, or how reliable they are. 
Third, many recent spreading activation models (Anderson, 1982) propose that no limit be placed on 
the numeric "activation level" associated with a node. Instead, a decay function, dependent on the 
elapsed time since activation, is used to stop activation levels from increasing without bound. This al­
lows the models to use the level of activation as an "associative relevancy" heuristic (Anderson, 1982) 
which states: The greater the activation of a node, the more relevant and closely associated it is to the 
problem. However, in this model we are representing belief, not activation, and belief can be bounded 
by truth, b; = 1, and falsehood, b; = -1. The relative importance of an endorsement, rii• and its relative 
certainty, rc;, provide a measure similar to the ''associative relevance" heuristic. Using a decay function 
can provide erroneous results in a belief maintenance system. Consider, for example, that doing WELL 
IN MATH endorses being a GOOD MATH STUDENT which in turn endorses taking a MATH MAJOR. In a model 
with a decay function the activation for being a MATRMAJOR will be less if activation has spread from the 
first endorsement than if it spread only from GOOD MATH sTUDENT. This is because it takes longer for 
activation to spread through three links as opposed to two. This is counter-intuitive, because if GOOD 
MATH sTUDENT is unsupported then it is not really as good a source of support. For this reason, this 
model uses inhibitory endorsements and bounded beliefs along with a relaxation algorithm to control 
the propagation and level of belief (Craddock 1986). 
A further difference is that the proposed model can represent varying degrees of interaction between 
sources of evidence while models such as MYCIN (Shortcliffe, 1975) must make the assumption that 
all evidence is conditionally independent and that hypotheses are mutually exclusive. For example, the 
dynamic strengths of endorsement (see figure 1) allow us to represent evidence which is disjunctive, 
that is, strong belief may be propagated on the basis of only one of many supports. The endorsement 
with the greatest combination of relative certainty, belief and support inhibits the strengths of 
endorsement from the other nodes endorsing the decision so that they are effectively ignored. The 
amount of inhibition can be varied so that in instances where the endorsements are dependent no 
inhibition takes place. This is not to be confused with instances in which the proposition's belief is 
inhibitorly endorsed. To do so would indicate that its supporting evidence had been changed resulting 
in the unfortunate side-effect of altering the support the effected node would provide in an independent 
decision (Craddock 1986). 
5. HEURISTICS: Within the model presented, uncertain knowledge is dealt with by using two distinct 
classes of heuristics. The first class of heuristics are used to determine which information is relevant 
to a decision. This class of heuristics is used to guide the collecting of endorsements. The second class 
of heuristics can then be used to evaluate the collected endorsements. 
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The first class of heuristics are influenced by the methods which humans appear to use while con­
straining and simplifying a problem; making the uncertain knowledge manageable but still useful. Of 
particular importance are Kahneman and Tversky's (1973, 1982a, b, c) heuristics of relevance and 
availability, and Anderson's (1982) previously mentioned heuristic of associative relevance. These 
heuristics make the common statement that the only propositions which will be endorsed are those with 
endorsements. It is safe to assume that those propositions which are not endorsed are either irrelevant 
or unavailable to the decision task. As mentioned in section 4 the available information with the 
greatest combined belief, relative certainty and relative importance is weighted with proportionate 
strength in the calculation of belief and certainty in formulae [3] and [4]. 
The second class of heuristics are influenced by the findings that bodies of evidence interact in complex 
ways. Among those modelled is Kahneman and Tversky's (ibid) heuristic of adjustment and 
anchoring, used to describe the human characteristic of making estimates from an initial value and then 
adjusting it to give the final answer. As mentioned in section 4 and formulae (3] and[-+], endorsements 
with the greatest combined belief, relative certainty, and relative support, are weighted proportionately. 
The final belief values are thus biased or anchored towards these endorsements to model the 
phenomenon called adjustment. 
In addition, the second class of heuristics attempt. to model Kahneman and Tversky's (ibid) heuristic 
of representativeness. Kahneman and Tversky discovered that the similarity between data has a dra­
matic impact on how conclusions are weighted. As agreement between evidence increases so does the 
certainty of conclusions. As seen in formula [2], an endorsement with absolute uncertainty, rc, = 0, will 
have no effect on the weighted sum of support in [3] and [4]. This heuristic is called the ignorance 
heuristic. In a similar fashion the certainty heuristic states that as the overall certainty of a set of 
endorsements decreases, i.e. as L.rc; approaches 1, so does the resultant certainty, i.e. 
1- l: I bk- bi I rk;'Ck approaches 0. Finally, in formulae [4], certainty is inversely proportional to the 
disagreement between an endorsements belief, b;, and the newly calculated belief, bi , of the endorsed 
node. This allows us to model the range heuristic which states that certainty will be a maximum if all 
the endorsements agree in their new belief of the node, and the resolution heuristic, which states that 
as supporting evidence moves closer to the same value, disagreement will decrease and so will uncer­
tainty. We shall now see what happens when endorsements are in complete disagreement. 
6. CONTRADICTION�: Rational contradictions among endorsements are defined as follows: If A is 
compelling evidence against n; but b is equally compelling evidence for n; then the endorsements for 
n; are inconsistent. In addition to a rational contraction an intuitive contradiction can also be defined: 
If the intuitive belief, b'; is not equal to the rational belief, b; then the two beliefs are inconsistent. 
Intuitive contradictions are useful for recognizing changes in belief through a knowledge base when 
knowledge is added and removed. In addition they can be used to control cycles which may force more 
global interpretations on input propositions. When cycles exist within a network N = <P, S>, belief 
and certainty values will only be calculated for nodes in a partial network N' = P', S', where P'c;;,P , and 
S'c;;, Sn(PXP'), where there exists a node n; E P - P' such that there is an elementary path between n; 
to P' and I I; - R; I > T;. 
CONCLUSIONS: The model discussed in this paper seeks to develop representational and inference 
mechanisms capable of dealing with incomplete, inaccurate, and uncertain information. To this end, 
a model is proposed al}� heuristics are developed to collect and evaluate the endorsements for prop­
ositions in the network of beliefs. At the same time it is intended that the model represent at least 
some of the processes used in human reasoning. As the downfall of many expert systems with large 
data bases is that they can not determine which data is relevant to the problem, artificial intelligence 
may be able to use reasoning methods similar to humans to deal more effectively with uncertainty in 
decision making. 
A second conclusion is that heuristics provide a very useful means of guiding the collection and eval­
uation of information. The constraints that these heuristics place on the decision making not only 
simplify the task, but allow uncertainty to remain useful. While the heuristics proposed in this paper 
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are by no means exhaustive nor the formulae necessarily optimal, they do illustrate how heuristics 
might be incorporated into the decision making model in a straight forward fashion (Craddock 1986). 
Finally, of major issue is the belief that numerical values, blindly tallied, are an inadequate repre­
sentation of reasoning. Symbolic structures of support are necessary to specify how and why numeric 
beliefs are calculated. The incorporation of numerically qualified endorsements allows the model to 
not only provide numerical information, but it can also describe its reasoning process from start to 
finish in terms of reasons for and against a decision. The advantages of having a model whose reasoning 
can be readily understood are numerous if the model is to be used in situations where it is imperative 
that the justifications for a decision be made clear. In its present prototype form it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which the model may act as a model of human reasoning. It does, however, 
offer some attractive directions for further research. 
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